A c c e p t e d m a n u s c r i p t
Introduction 22
Predation is an almost ubiquitous process in the natural world, and very few animals 23 are immune to the risk of predation for at least part of their life history. Since 24 predation is responsible for a large proportion of mortality in many species, it is no 25 surprise that anti-predatory defences are also widespread and intensively studied by 26 behavioural ecologists (see Ruxton et al. 2004 and Caro 2005 for reviews). Caro 27 identified one of the ten most pressing questions in the study of anti-predatory 28 defences as "how can we explain patterns of morphological and physiological 29 defences across taxa?" There is indeed tremendous variety between species in the 30 forms of anti-predatory defences employed. However, there is even substantial 31 variability within an individual in the defences they employ against different attacks 32 (Buskirk 2001 and references therein). The conventional explanation of this variation 33 is that many individuals face risk of predation from a suite of different predatory types 34 for which different defences might be required. For example, a single caterpillar 35 might face attack by avian predators, predatory social wasps, parasitic wasps and flies, 36 ants, spiders, and even insectivorous rodents. Whilst visual crypsis may be an 37 effective defence against detection by birds, it is unlikely to be as effective against 38
ants that rely more on tactile, vibrational and olfactory cues to locate their prey. 39
However, variation in predatory threat (while certainly part of the answer) cannot be 40 the sole driver of within-individual variation in defences, since a single individual can 41 m a n u s c r i p t 8 indicating the investment in pre-capture defences, with increasing values indicating 120 increasing investment. The probability that an encounter with a predator leads to 121 capture (P 1 ) is a decreasing function of D 1 . That is, increasing investment in pre-122 encounter defences reduces the probability that the prey individual will be 123 successfully captured by any predator that encounters it. 124 125 Post-capture defences involve such things as fighting ability, venomous stings, 126 armoured integument and production of mucus. All these defences have in common 127 the fact that they reduce the probability (P 2 ) that capture leads to the death (and thus 128 consumption) of the prey (i.e. capture leads to successful predation). We describe 129 increasing investment in post-capture defences by increasing values of D 2 , with P 2 130 declining with increasing values of D 2 . That is, increasing investment in post-capture 131 defences reduces the probability that a predator that physically captures the prey is 132 able to subdue, kill and consume it. 133
134
We are interested in finding the optimal strategy in terms of investment in these two 135 defences. There are costs, as well as benefits, to investment in defence. We first of all 136 assume that there are fixed costs to the creation of the defences. Thus, even if the prey 137 individual never encounters a predator, it pays a cost for its investment in defences. However, as well as fixed costs, we assume that there can be additional costs every 145 time a defence is used. For example, for pre-capture defences, we can imagine that 146 there is a fixed cost to building and maintaining the muscle structure required for fast 147 escape, but there is an additional cost (say in energy expended and/or feeding time 148 lost) every time that defence is used and the prey has to flee. Specifically we assume 149 that if the prey encounters a predator on a number of occasions N a , then it has to use 150 its pre-capture defence on N a occasions. The cost of these encounters is represented 151 by multiplying the fecundity of the prey individual by [ 
Na , where C 1 (0) = 1 152 (that is unaffected if there is no investment in defence) and C 1 declines with 153 increasing values of D 1 (and thus fecundity declines both the investment in defence 154 and with how often the defences are used). This formulation captures the assumptions 155 that the costs of using pre-capture defences increase both with the number of times 156 these defences are used and with the extent of these defences. That is, greater 157 investment in pre-capture defence reduces the risk of capture, but also incurs higher 158 fixed costs and costs that increase with the number of time these defences are used. 159
160
Let us assume that of these N a encounters, a number N c lead to capture of the prey and 161 a number N n lead to no capture and the prey escaping. Thus, we assume that to 162 successfully survive these attacks the prey will have to successfully use its post-163 
If we take logs and divide by εT, we can simplify this to
Maximising the above function, maximises the payoff. In order to make further 213 progress, we must now specify the following functional forms. 214
. Thus, we assume that maximum fecundity 216 (before any predator encounters) is a decreasing decelerating function of both D 1 and 217 m a n u s c r i p t 12 D 2 . The higher the values of f 1 and f 2 , the higher the fixed costs of pre-capture and 218 post-capture defences respectively. 219
That is, we assume that the probability of an attack succeeding decreases linearly with 222 investment in defences. The higher the values of p 1 and p 2 the higher the anti-223 predatory efficacy of pre-capture and post-capture defences respectively. 224
We assume that the cost of defences increases linearly with the investment in 227 
Expressed in terms of β 1 and β 2 this becomes 291 292 Note, however, a significant difference between conditions (4) & (6); whilst a 2 had no 380 effect on the boundaries of the pre-attack only case, a 1 (as well as a 2 ) does affect the 381 boundaries of the post-attack only case. This asymmetry arises from the fundamental 382 asymmetry between the two types of defences, pre-attack defences occur before post-383 attack defences, and thus influence the frequency with which post-attack defences are 384 used. However, post-attack defences do not affect the frequency with which pre-385 attack defences are used. Increasing a 1 (increasing the costs of utilising a pre-attack 386 defence or decreasing its efficacy) increases the extent of (β 1 ,β 2 ) space where this 387 post-attack only investment strategy occurs -again this is just as we would expect. 388 389
Non-zero investment in both forms of defence 390
At such a solution, the derivatives of equation (1) with respect to both D 1 and D 2 will 391 be zero. Substituting the specific functional forms and differentiating gives: 392 Using the standard methodology of considering the determinant of the Hessian matrix, 418 the solution will be stable when this determinant is negative, so that 419 
It is clear that both second derivatives are negative and so we only need the first 429 condition to be solved. Substituting for D 2 in (8) and tidying yields 430
where D 1 is given by the solution of (11) and 
and (12) holds. An unstable solution occurs if (10) and (11) yield such values and (12) 439 does not hold. Unlike the other strategies discussed so far, this mixed-defences 440 strategy is not guaranteed to be stable whenever it exists. 441 (5) and (7) that (0,0) cannot co-exist with either of 449 the single defence strategies, and by noticing that the left hand side of equation (9) 450 decreases with increasing levels of either defence, it is also clear that it cannot co-451 exist with either of the two-defence solutions (either the two-defence solution is stable 452 when it exists or it is unstable). 
